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粗苯罐爆燃事故的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析與防控

文檔作者：張慧1 賈貝貝2 文檔來源： 1. 華陽集團(tuán)（山西）產(chǎn)業(yè)技術(shù)研究總院 2. 山西陽煤化工機(jī)械（集團(tuán)）有限公司		更新日期： 2026年05月29日	點(diǎn) 擊數(shù)：
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2023 年第39 卷第5 期
★　石油化工安全環(huán)保技術(shù)　★
PETROCHEMICAL SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY 32
1　事故概況
某年5 月8 日，某新建化工公司組織工藝、
設(shè)備、電氣、儀表、安全等專業(yè)人員對(duì)罐區(qū)設(shè)
備、設(shè)施進(jìn)行試生產(chǎn)前項(xiàng)目驗(yàn)收，發(fā)現(xiàn)粗苯罐氮
氣保護(hù)系統(tǒng)中存在氮?dú)夤芫€未置換，罐區(qū)可燃有
毒氣體檢測(cè)報(bào)警儀故障等安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，項(xiàng)目驗(yàn)收結(jié)
束驗(yàn)收人員如實(shí)記錄了項(xiàng)目驗(yàn)收意見、現(xiàn)場(chǎng)安全
風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和隱患，而公司未下發(fā)書面安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和隱患
告知書，無隱患“五定”整改閉合記錄。
5 月8 日以后，公司間斷組織對(duì)罐區(qū)氮?dú)饪?
管進(jìn)行氮?dú)庵脫Q時(shí)，發(fā)現(xiàn)泵房?jī)?nèi)的氮?dú)夥謿飧组y
組有泄漏現(xiàn)象，有引發(fā)巡檢人員窒息的安全風(fēng)
險(xiǎn)，分廠決定暫時(shí)停用氮?dú)饪偣埽瑢⒈梅績(jī)?nèi)氮?dú)?
分氣缸移至泵房外（無氮?dú)庵脫Q相關(guān)記錄，無相
關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、隱患記錄，事故后問詢得知）。
5 月26 日—6 月1 日，公司外購(gòu)251.92 t 粗
苯儲(chǔ)存于直徑21 m、罐高16.5 m、內(nèi)浮盤支撐高
度1.8 m 的內(nèi)浮盤式儲(chǔ)罐，粗苯罐液位計(jì)顯示為
0.88 m。6 月19 日公司下發(fā)《關(guān)于加強(qiáng)園區(qū)試生
產(chǎn)期間特殊作業(yè)管理的通知》明確要求“試生產(chǎn)
期間特殊作業(yè)實(shí)行升級(jí)管理”。
8 月15 日，分廠按程序辦理動(dòng)火作業(yè)票，作
業(yè)前未按照動(dòng)火作業(yè)票安全措施要求“斷開與動(dòng)
火設(shè)備相連接的所有管線”，僅關(guān)閉了2~5 號(hào)氮
收稿日期：2021-10-22
作者簡(jiǎn)介：張慧，男，2014 年畢業(yè)于太原科技大學(xué)過程
裝備與控制工程專業(yè)，主要從事安全環(huán)保管理工作，注冊(cè)
安全工程師，高級(jí)工程師。電話：13703537091，E-mail:
634262471@qq.com
粗苯罐爆燃事故的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析與防控
張　慧1，賈貝貝2
（1. 華陽集團(tuán)（山西）產(chǎn)業(yè)技術(shù)研究總院，山西 陽泉 045000 ；
2. 山西陽煤化工機(jī)械（集團(tuán)）有限公司，山西 太原 030006）
摘　要：某公司粗苯儲(chǔ)罐氮?dú)獗Ｗo(hù)管線動(dòng)火作業(yè)引發(fā)粗苯罐爆燃事故。文章從罐體的設(shè)計(jì)、粗苯
罐的運(yùn)行過程、氮?dú)夤芫€的動(dòng)火作業(yè)、變更作業(yè)以及安全管理幾方面，進(jìn)行安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析。分析發(fā)現(xiàn)
存在以下幾方面問題：動(dòng)火作業(yè)違章，建設(shè)項(xiàng)目“三查四定”未嚴(yán)格落實(shí)，安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患未及時(shí)整改，
排查和治理過程安全管理缺失，以及員工安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)意識(shí)淡薄。針對(duì)這些問題，文章最后提出了安全防
控的建議。
關(guān)鍵詞：粗苯儲(chǔ)罐　過程安全　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患　事故防控
氣閥門（事故后發(fā)現(xiàn)5 號(hào)閘閥關(guān)閉約4/5），隨后
對(duì)氮?dú)夤芫€進(jìn)行了動(dòng)火作業(yè)切割（圖1）。8 月16
日和8 月17 日，對(duì)氮?dú)夥謿飧组y組進(jìn)行了更換。
8 月18 日10 時(shí)，分廠辦理二級(jí)動(dòng)火票（該
區(qū)域?qū)儆诠咎厥鈩?dòng)火區(qū)域），10 時(shí)計(jì)劃對(duì)氮?dú)?
管進(jìn)行乙炔- 氧氣動(dòng)火切割作業(yè)，由于外單位人
員臨時(shí)參觀廠區(qū)，公司通知暫停全廠檢修作業(yè)，
上午未進(jìn)行動(dòng)火作業(yè)。8 月18 日14:30，動(dòng)火負(fù)
責(zé)人、動(dòng)火作業(yè)人、2 名鉗工、裝置區(qū)班長(zhǎng)、監(jiān)
火人到達(dá)動(dòng)火點(diǎn)，動(dòng)火作業(yè)前未進(jìn)行動(dòng)火分析，
約14:50，開始進(jìn)行氣焊動(dòng)火作業(yè)。15:10，因現(xiàn)
場(chǎng)工具、材料不齊全，暫停動(dòng)火作業(yè)，2 名鉗工
離開動(dòng)火點(diǎn)返回檢修室搬運(yùn)工具、材料；監(jiān)火
人、裝置區(qū)班長(zhǎng)分別離開動(dòng)火點(diǎn)進(jìn)行罐區(qū)巡檢，
相關(guān)人員離開后動(dòng)火負(fù)責(zé)人、動(dòng)火人擅自進(jìn)行電
焊動(dòng)火作業(yè)。15:13，視頻監(jiān)控顯示苯罐頂量油孔
L1 噴出黑煙和液體，苯罐底部與罐底基礎(chǔ)分離
開始上升，罐頂H2 環(huán)形通氣孔噴出黑煙和火焰、
H1 環(huán)形通氣孔端蓋飛起；后苯罐加速抬升，罐
★ 張　慧等. 粗苯罐爆燃事故的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析與防控 ★ 33 2023 年第39 卷第5 期
體下部清掃孔區(qū)域出現(xiàn)撕裂口，大量粗苯液體噴
出，罐體浮盤檢修人孔區(qū)域與底板撕裂粗苯液體
噴出并發(fā)生爆燃，粗苯罐體與底板被整體撕裂分
離，整個(gè)罐體底部抬升約7~8 m，隨后墜落于原
粗苯罐東南側(cè)罐區(qū)內(nèi)的防火隔墻上，墜落后與南
側(cè)相鄰的空儲(chǔ)罐罐頂發(fā)生碰撞，墜落區(qū)域產(chǎn)生爆
燃火球和蘑菇云。
2　事故現(xiàn)場(chǎng)勘查
事故粗苯罐為弱頂結(jié)構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)，儲(chǔ)罐除與12
號(hào)罐碰撞區(qū)域出現(xiàn)變形和破損口外，其余部分基
本呈現(xiàn)事故前的連接狀態(tài)，筒體與儲(chǔ)罐鋼板撕裂
后完全分離（圖3）。罐頂T2 和T3 油氣回收孔
及連接的呼吸閥完好，爆炸時(shí)T2 油氣回收孔與
罐頂連接處開裂（圖4）；碳鋼端蓋封堵的環(huán)形
通氣孔H1 處于全通徑貫通狀態(tài)；石棉膠板盲堵
的環(huán)形通氣孔H2 處于全通徑貫通狀態(tài)；罐體底
板凹凸變形保留在基礎(chǔ)上，由北向南翻起折疊狀
態(tài)約6.7 m 長(zhǎng)；罐頂南側(cè)安裝的緊急保溫通風(fēng)器
完好；事故現(xiàn)場(chǎng)有不銹鋼浮盤靜電導(dǎo)線，殘余的
內(nèi)浮盤構(gòu)件、浮盤導(dǎo)向繩上殘余浮盤、雷達(dá)液位
計(jì)底部殘余浮盤上的鋁皮參照浮盤構(gòu)架呈下翻狀
態(tài)（圖5、圖6），罐頂油氣回收系統(tǒng)閥門100%
關(guān)閉，儲(chǔ)罐底部物料出口管道根部閥、緊急切斷
調(diào)節(jié)閥100% 關(guān)閉，粗苯進(jìn)料管根部閥100% 開
啟，緊急切斷調(diào)節(jié)閥100% 關(guān)閉。11 號(hào)儲(chǔ)罐罐頂
至氮?dú)饪偣艿牡獨(dú)夤? 號(hào)閥門100% 開啟；逆止
閥安裝方向正確且完好；2 號(hào)、3 號(hào)、4 號(hào)閥門
100% 關(guān)閉；5 號(hào)閥門關(guān)閉約80%（圖7）。現(xiàn)場(chǎng)
圖1　罐區(qū)、泵房及附屬管線主要閥門平面布置示意
1. G1、G2、G3送樣檢測(cè)氮?dú)夤芏危?. G1檢出萘、C2苯、二氯丁烯、茚等；3. G2檢出甲苯、C2苯、萘、烷基苯基酮等；
4. G3檢出乙烯基苯、二氯丁烯、萘、甲基萘甲苯、C2苯、C3苯等
圖2　罐頂俯視示意
1. H1原碳鋼端蓋封閉的環(huán)形通氣孔；2. H 2原石棉膠板封閉環(huán)形
通氣孔；3. K1人孔為封閉狀態(tài)；4. K 2設(shè)置緊急泄壓裝置的檢查
孔；5. L1量油孔；6. L 2雷達(dá)液位計(jì)；7. N氮?dú)膺M(jìn)口管；8. Y1儲(chǔ)罐
壓力變送器；9. Y2油氣回收管及呼吸閥；10. Y3油氣回收管及呼
吸閥；11. T1呼吸閥；12. T 2設(shè)有氮?dú)夤芗坝蜌饣厥展艿耐饪祝?
13. T3設(shè)有油氣回收的通氣孔
★　石油化工安全環(huán)保技術(shù)　★ 34 2023 年第39 卷第5 期
3　粗苯罐事故安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析
事故后對(duì)罐頂、罐體、罐底區(qū)域鋼板進(jìn)行取
氣體檢測(cè)報(bào)警儀未投用。DCS 系統(tǒng)中事故罐顯示
液位0.655 m，DCS 系統(tǒng)無低液位、低低液位報(bào)
警記錄，雷達(dá)液位計(jì)處于故障狀態(tài)。
圖3　事故后的粗苯罐
圖4　粗苯罐頂部破損部位
圖 5　浮盤導(dǎo)向繩上浮盤殘余構(gòu)件 圖 6　雷達(dá)液位計(jì)部殘余的浮盤
★ 張　慧等. 粗苯罐爆燃事故的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析與防控 ★ 35 2023 年第39 卷第5 期
狀態(tài)進(jìn)行罐頂與罐底應(yīng)力計(jì)算：
罐頂（球冠封頭）受壓時(shí)最大應(yīng)力：
σmax 頂 = PD/4δ
罐底（平蓋封頭）受壓時(shí)最大應(yīng)力：
σmax 底 = KP(D/δ)2
σmax 頂/σmax 底 ≈ 1/770
根據(jù)應(yīng)力計(jì)算，粗苯罐氣相空間發(fā)生爆炸
時(shí)，底部應(yīng)力約是頂部應(yīng)力的770 倍，儲(chǔ)罐底部
最先發(fā)生凸起變形，引發(fā)儲(chǔ)罐整體升起，在罐底
部應(yīng)力集中的排污清掃孔首先撕裂，進(jìn)而使整個(gè)
罐體與罐底完全撕裂開，導(dǎo)致罐內(nèi)粗苯液體從底
部噴出，在罐體爆炸合力的作用下罐體爆燃并在
垂直和水平方向發(fā)生位移，造成粗苯液體大量泄
漏進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致事態(tài)進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大。
事故單位安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管控不到位，未辨識(shí)化學(xué)
品儲(chǔ)罐設(shè)計(jì)、制造等方面的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，導(dǎo)致未及
時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)弱頂儲(chǔ)罐結(jié)構(gòu)缺陷；事故單位組織的“三
查四定”工作不嚴(yán)格，建設(shè)、設(shè)計(jì)、施工、監(jiān)理
單位均未發(fā)現(xiàn)設(shè)計(jì)漏項(xiàng)、工程質(zhì)量、工程隱患方
面的問題，導(dǎo)致風(fēng)險(xiǎn)未有效控制。
3.1　粗苯罐過程安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析
粗苯原料的化學(xué)品危險(xiǎn)性專項(xiàng)檢測(cè)報(bào)告顯示：
在檢測(cè)環(huán)境溫度24.9~25 ℃、相對(duì)濕度54.8%~
57.2%、大氣壓強(qiáng)100.1~101.4 kPa 時(shí)，粗苯飽和
樣，并委托某研究院特種設(shè)備檢驗(yàn)所進(jìn)行檢測(cè)，
檢測(cè)報(bào)告結(jié)果顯示：罐頂屈服強(qiáng)度偏小其余指標(biāo)
符合國(guó)家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)GB 50341 要求，罐體、罐底樣品
檢測(cè)指標(biāo)全部符合國(guó)家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)GB 50341 要求。事
故罐包邊角鋼與罐頂連接處坡度為0.565 77 大于
GB 50341 規(guī)定的值0.166 667 ；事故后采用按照
GB 50341 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)編制的工程軟件進(jìn)行計(jì)算。結(jié)果
顯示：事故罐設(shè)計(jì)圖紙中罐頂與罐壁連接處有效
面積Aact（2 696）大于弱頂結(jié)構(gòu)要求的最大有效
截面積Amax（1 089），不符合弱頂設(shè)計(jì)要求（圖
8），未增加罐頂安全泄壓設(shè)施的設(shè)計(jì)措施，導(dǎo)致
爆燃事故狀態(tài)下的安全泄壓泄爆薄弱環(huán)節(jié)設(shè)計(jì)失
效，因此弱頂結(jié)構(gòu)的內(nèi)浮頂儲(chǔ)罐事故發(fā)生后，罐
頂除碰撞區(qū)域有1 處破損口外，其余部分基本保
持事故前狀態(tài)。
事故儲(chǔ)罐高16.5 m，粗苯核算液位為0.88 m，
氣相空間約占儲(chǔ)罐95%，爆燃能量大幅增大，按
照GB 150.3 計(jì)算D。/δe>20，粗苯罐可視為薄壁
圓筒壓力容器，罐頂可視球冠封頭、罐底可視為
非圓形平蓋封頭，球冠半徑等于筒體內(nèi)徑約21
m、頂板厚度6 mm，筒壁厚度自上而下為6，8，
10，12，14 和16 mm，底板厚度12 mm。按照
GB 150.3 平蓋結(jié)構(gòu)特征系數(shù)K=0.44 時(shí)，按空罐
圖7　氮?dú)夤芫€旁通閥事故前安裝位置及事故后閥芯外觀
圖8　按照GB 50341 編制的工程軟件對(duì)事故儲(chǔ)罐設(shè)計(jì)參數(shù)計(jì)算結(jié)論
★　石油化工安全環(huán)保技術(shù)　★ 36 2023 年第39 卷第5 期
護(hù)氮?dú)夤┯眉巴Ｓ谩⒌獨(dú)夤軘嚅_前后等情形的安
全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行分析和研判，實(shí)施變更作業(yè)后未組織
評(píng)估驗(yàn)收，操作規(guī)程沒有增加氮?dú)夤芫€正常、異
常操作的相關(guān)內(nèi)容，間接導(dǎo)致罐區(qū)管理人員、檢
修人員對(duì)粗苯罐安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)估計(jì)不足，安全交底不
徹底、安全措施未落實(shí)、隱患長(zhǎng)時(shí)間未消除，引
發(fā)粗苯罐爆燃事故。
3.4　安全管理過程風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析
3.4.1　安全生產(chǎn)責(zé)任制未落實(shí)
公司組織罐區(qū)裝置試運(yùn)行前驗(yàn)收發(fā)現(xiàn)存在氣
體檢測(cè)報(bào)警系統(tǒng)未投入使用、雷達(dá)液位計(jì)故障、
罐區(qū)可燃?xì)怏w報(bào)警儀故障等安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和隱患，長(zhǎng)
時(shí)間未按照安監(jiān)總局《企業(yè)安全生產(chǎn)責(zé)任體系五
落實(shí)五到位規(guī)定》（安監(jiān)總辦〔2015〕27 號(hào)）文
件要求落實(shí)，造成發(fā)現(xiàn)的隱患整改措施、整改責(zé)
任人、整改時(shí)間、安全資金投入未明確，未實(shí)現(xiàn)
閉環(huán)管理，導(dǎo)致隱患長(zhǎng)時(shí)間未消除。
3.4.2　 重大危險(xiǎn)源儲(chǔ)存裝置區(qū)過程安全管理責(zé)任
未落實(shí)
未落實(shí)《危險(xiǎn)化學(xué)品企業(yè)安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患排
查治理導(dǎo)則》，對(duì)涉及“兩重點(diǎn)一重大”和首次
工業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)的建設(shè)項(xiàng)目，應(yīng)在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)計(jì)階段開展
HAZOP 分析工作，導(dǎo)致浮盤落底、保護(hù)氮?dú)馔?
用、特殊作業(yè)等的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)未辨識(shí)，安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱
患未及時(shí)排查治理。
3.4.3　從業(yè)人員安全教育培訓(xùn)規(guī)定不嚴(yán)格落實(shí)
查閱事故單位罐區(qū)從業(yè)人員和事故負(fù)責(zé)維保
的承包商隊(duì)伍“三級(jí)”安全教育檔案、考試卷等
存在代簽、代考現(xiàn)象。安全教育培訓(xùn)不真實(shí)導(dǎo)致
罐區(qū)從業(yè)人員不具備重大危險(xiǎn)源從業(yè)理論知識(shí)和
技能，粗苯罐區(qū)浮盤長(zhǎng)期落底、安全設(shè)施異常等
安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患未及時(shí)排查治理；導(dǎo)致罐區(qū)從業(yè)人
員安全意識(shí)淡薄，違規(guī)組織動(dòng)火作業(yè)，動(dòng)火作業(yè)
安全措施不落實(shí)，導(dǎo)致監(jiān)火人、動(dòng)火負(fù)責(zé)人、動(dòng)
火人不清楚崗位安全責(zé)任，動(dòng)火實(shí)施過程中監(jiān)火
人離開動(dòng)火點(diǎn)進(jìn)行罐區(qū)巡檢，監(jiān)火人離開后動(dòng)火
負(fù)責(zé)人、動(dòng)火人繼續(xù)實(shí)施動(dòng)火作業(yè)等連環(huán)安全管
理缺陷的出現(xiàn)。
蒸汽壓可達(dá)14.0 kPa，爆炸極限為1.15%~6.5%，
燃點(diǎn)<40.0 ℃，閉杯閃點(diǎn)-13.0 ℃，送檢的粗苯
樣品不屬于發(fā)火性液體。根據(jù)檢測(cè)數(shù)據(jù)可以推
算事故環(huán)境中儲(chǔ)罐內(nèi)可燃?xì)怏w濃度最高時(shí)可達(dá)
到13.8%（v%）。事故粗苯罐進(jìn)料后，粗苯液位
液面高度（0.88 m）低于浮盤支撐腿高度（1.8
m），違反《油氣罐區(qū)防火防爆十條規(guī)定》（安監(jiān)
總政法[2017]15 號(hào)文件）“嚴(yán)禁內(nèi)浮頂儲(chǔ)罐運(yùn)行
中浮盤落底”的規(guī)定，公司日常各類安全檢查沒
有發(fā)現(xiàn)儲(chǔ)罐長(zhǎng)期低液位運(yùn)行、保護(hù)氮?dú)馔Ｓ玫?
事故隱患，導(dǎo)致浮盤和油面之間形成0.92 m 高
的氣相空間，粗苯蒸氣比空氣重，在79 d 日均
溫度25 ℃環(huán)境下儲(chǔ)罐內(nèi)液面上部約5 400 m3 的
氣相空間粗苯蒸氣濃度自下而上呈現(xiàn)垂直遞減，
在氣相空間中存在爆炸極限范圍內(nèi)的粗苯蒸氣
濃度。
3.2　氮?dú)夤芫€動(dòng)火作業(yè)安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析
粗苯儲(chǔ)罐呼吸閥排氣壓力1.5 kPa、通風(fēng)器排
氣壓力1.76 kPa（表）密閉的粗苯儲(chǔ)罐內(nèi)的氣相
空間壓力高于大氣壓力。8 月15 日，氮?dú)夤艿狼?
割后管道內(nèi)有殘余的氮?dú)猓虝r(shí)間的動(dòng)火切割作
業(yè)未引發(fā)事故。開口后氮?dú)夤艿琅c大氣完全連通，
粗苯儲(chǔ)罐氣相空間的粗苯蒸氣在0~1.5 kPa 壓差
的作用下，沿未關(guān)閉的1 號(hào)閥、逆止閥（旋啟式
止回閥）和未完全關(guān)閉的5 號(hào)閥及相連通的管道
進(jìn)行逸散。8 月18 日下午，動(dòng)火作業(yè)違反《化學(xué)
品生產(chǎn)單位特殊作業(yè)安全規(guī)程》（GB 30871）和
“試生產(chǎn)期間特殊作業(yè)實(shí)行升級(jí)管理”公司規(guī)定，
違規(guī)降低動(dòng)火作業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等級(jí)，在未落實(shí)“斷開與
動(dòng)火設(shè)備相連通的所有管線安全措施”、動(dòng)火作
業(yè)前未進(jìn)行動(dòng)火分析的情況下，違章進(jìn)行動(dòng)火作
業(yè)，監(jiān)火人離開動(dòng)火作業(yè)區(qū)后繼續(xù)違規(guī)動(dòng)火作
業(yè)，導(dǎo)致動(dòng)火作業(yè)的明火引爆氮?dú)夤芫€及與之連
通的粗苯儲(chǔ)罐內(nèi)的粗苯蒸氣，發(fā)生粗苯儲(chǔ)罐爆燃
事故。
3.3　變更作業(yè)安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析
粗苯罐技改后、進(jìn)料前、進(jìn)料后、粗苯罐氮
氣分氣缸檢修作業(yè)、氮?dú)饪偣芮懈畹茸兏鳂I(yè)，
未履行變更管理程序，未對(duì)內(nèi)浮頂儲(chǔ)罐技改、保
★ 張　慧等. 粗苯罐爆燃事故的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析與防控 ★ 37 2023 年第39 卷第5 期
產(chǎn)教育和培訓(xùn)計(jì)劃有效實(shí)施。
企業(yè)應(yīng)當(dāng)嚴(yán)格從業(yè)人員準(zhǔn)入管理，保證從業(yè)
人員學(xué)歷、技術(shù)職稱、工作經(jīng)歷符合崗位要求，
并嚴(yán)格按照《生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)單位安全培訓(xùn)規(guī)定》、《特
種作業(yè)人員安全技術(shù)培訓(xùn)考核管理規(guī)定》及企業(yè)
安全教育培訓(xùn)需求組織制定并實(shí)施安全教育和培
訓(xùn)計(jì)劃，保證從業(yè)人員具備崗位專業(yè)技能和應(yīng)急
處置能力。
4.2　 組織開展危險(xiǎn)源辨識(shí)和評(píng)估，落實(shí)重大危險(xiǎn)
源安全管理措施
企業(yè)應(yīng)當(dāng)嚴(yán)格按照危險(xiǎn)化學(xué)品重大危險(xiǎn)源
監(jiān)督管理規(guī)定組織重大危險(xiǎn)源辨識(shí)與評(píng)估、重大
危險(xiǎn)源管理，嚴(yán)格落實(shí)重大危險(xiǎn)源安全承包責(zé)任
制，保證重大危險(xiǎn)源安全監(jiān)控報(bào)警系統(tǒng)、安全儀
表系統(tǒng)、緊急切斷系統(tǒng)、安全附件等及時(shí)投用并
處于正常狀態(tài)。
4.3　強(qiáng)化應(yīng)急管理，保障應(yīng)急能力
企業(yè)應(yīng)當(dāng)建立健全應(yīng)急管理體系，科學(xué)制
定應(yīng)急預(yù)案和現(xiàn)場(chǎng)處置方案，定期組織應(yīng)急培訓(xùn)
和教育，定期組織應(yīng)急演練，提升全員應(yīng)急處置
能力。
4　粗苯罐安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防控
4.1　 建立健全并嚴(yán)格落實(shí)全員崗位安全生產(chǎn)責(zé)任
制，消除安全管理缺陷
1）按照崗位職責(zé)嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行建設(shè)項(xiàng)目“三查
四定”制度，及時(shí)排查設(shè)計(jì)漏項(xiàng)、未完工程、工
程質(zhì)量及隱患，發(fā)現(xiàn)的隱患問題嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行“定任
務(wù)、定人員、定時(shí)間、定措施”，并限期消除生
產(chǎn)安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患，從源頭強(qiáng)化本質(zhì)安全型企業(yè)
建設(shè)。
2）嚴(yán)格作業(yè)安全管理，強(qiáng)化變更管理、特
殊作業(yè)等關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)管控措施。涉及嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行變更
管理、特殊作業(yè)等的管理規(guī)定，強(qiáng)化申請(qǐng)、審
批、實(shí)施、驗(yàn)收等關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)管控，從管理流程上
防控安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，消除安全隱患。
3）嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行《危險(xiǎn)化學(xué)品企業(yè)安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱
患排查治理導(dǎo)則》，嚴(yán)格按照規(guī)定開展綜合性、
專業(yè)性等安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患排查治理，并嚴(yán)格按照安
全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)“四項(xiàng)管控措施”控制安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，嚴(yán)格按
照隱患“五落實(shí)”要求消除安全隱患，保障安全
生產(chǎn)投入有效治理安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患。
4）嚴(yán)格從業(yè)人員準(zhǔn)入管理，并保證安全生
的安全實(shí)施奠定了堅(jiān)實(shí)基礎(chǔ)[4]。
3）重點(diǎn)產(chǎn)能建設(shè)項(xiàng)目HSE 駐場(chǎng)監(jiān)督模式的
建立，使監(jiān)督人員與區(qū)域內(nèi)有關(guān)單位有效建立
“信息共享”，及時(shí)掌握重點(diǎn)產(chǎn)能建設(shè)項(xiàng)目實(shí)施動(dòng)
態(tài)，實(shí)現(xiàn)高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作業(yè)階段全過程HSE 監(jiān)督，有效
彌補(bǔ)了常規(guī)HSE 監(jiān)督模式的不足，實(shí)現(xiàn)了高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)
作業(yè)活動(dòng)的“精準(zhǔn)”監(jiān)督。
參考文獻(xiàn)：
[1] 李長(zhǎng)勇. 淺析HSE 管理體系在油氣田企業(yè)
中的運(yùn)用及對(duì)策[J]. 石油化工安全環(huán)保技
術(shù)，2017，33（2）：1-3.
[2] 李國(guó)棟. 抓實(shí)危害識(shí)別舉措，保障施工安全
[J]. 石油化工安全環(huán)保技術(shù)，2017，33（6）：
9-13.
[3] 徐仁浩. 石油化工企業(yè)過程安全管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管
控的探討與實(shí)踐[J]. 石油化工安全環(huán)保技
術(shù)，2017，33（2）：29-32.
[4] 李長(zhǎng)勇. HSE 監(jiān)督管理系統(tǒng)研制及數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)
構(gòu)建[J]. 石油化工安全環(huán)保技術(shù)，2017，33
（6）：1-6.
（上接第3 頁）
features, and conducts fault warning through state upper
limit and feature development prediction. Finally, experimental
verification shows that the proposed method can
provide safety warning and traceability of faults one hour
in advance, which can effectively guarantee the operation
safety of the equipment.
Key words: plunger pump; safety monitoring; fault diagnosis;
safety warning
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION TECHNICAL STANDARDS
FOR TANK BREATHER VALVES AT HOME AND
ABROAD[22]
Qiu Chunxia1, Zhang Yan2,Wang Xinhua3.(1. Transportation
Emission Control and Monitoring Technology
Laboratory, Transport Planning and Research Institute,
Ministry of Transport, Beijing, 100088; 2. Nanjing Protego
Safe Equipment Engineering Co., Ltd., Shanghai,
200120;3.Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University,
Guangzhou,510000)
Abstract: This paper introduces the worldwide development
process and technologies of breather valves in
the field of storage and transportation. It analyzes the
current status of atmospheric pollution by VOCs emitted
from breather valve leakage. It compares the differences
in product standards, safety and environmental protection
performance, and detection technologies between
developed countries and China. Then the paper puts
forward suggestions for the development of China’s
breather valve standards and safety and environmental
protection technology, including upgrading the relevant
contents of China’s breather valve technical standards
and specifications, developing homemade safe and environment-
friendly breather valves and so forth. The paper
also explores the ways to improve the safety performance
of oil and chemicals in the field of storage and transportation,
especially the breather valves of the tanks, as well
as the effective emission reduction of VOCs.
Key words: storage tank; breather valve; safety and environmental
protection; standard
HAZARDOUS FACTORS DURING LIQUEFIED
PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION
AND COUNTERMEASURES[26]
Wu Yizhe1, Liu Liu1, Wu Yingying2.(1. PipeChina Southwest
Pipeline Company, Chengdu, Sichuan, 610000; 2.
PetroChina Liaoyang Petrochemical Company, Liaoyang,
Liaoning, 111003)
Abstract: Because of its high calorific value, no smoke,
no carbon residue and convenient operation, liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) is a versatile chemical that is increasingly
making its way into the realm of people’s
lives. Due to its special physicochemical properties,
there are safety risks in its storage and transportation
process. For the safe storage and transportation of LPG,
targeted safety measures should be taken according to
the storage and transportation characteristics of LPG so
as to ensure the safe use of LPG in essence. By analyzing
the storage mode and transportation way of LPG,
it is pointed out that fire, explosion, static electricity,
poisoning and frostbite in the storage and transportation
process are all dangerous and harmful factors that
may cause accidents. Targeted prevention and control
against these factors can greatly reduce the risk factors
in the storage and transportation process of LPG.
Key words: liquefied petroleum gas/LPG; hazardous
factors; countermeasures
OPTIMIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL APPLICATION
OF PROCESS ANTI-CORROSION MEASURES
FOR CORROSION INHIBITOR[28]
Ma Hongjie1, Zuo Yongguang2, Wu Shichang3, Liu
Zhicun2, Xue Hongyan1. (1.Research Institute of Petrochina
Dushanzi Petrochemical Company，Dushanzi,
Xinjiang, 833699; 2.Equipment Division of Petrochina
Dushanzi Petrochemical Company，Dushanzi, Xinjiang,
833699; 3.Ethylene Plant of Petrochina Dushanzi
Petrochemical Company，Dushanzi, Xinjiang, 833699)
Abstract: The corrosion of equipment and pipeline was
serious in the top tower system of eliminator of carbon
5 in the gasoline hydrogenation unit of certain company
and the corrosion mechanism was wet hydrogen sulfide
corrosion. The poor performance of the original corrosion
inhibitor, the improper injection dose and the location
of the injection point were the main influencing
factors resulting in unsatisfactory anti-corrosion effect
of corrosion inhibitor injection process at the top of the
tower. The results of the evaluation on the performance
of the original tower top corrosion inhibitor show that
the maximum corrosion rate of the corrosion inhibitor
was only 52.54%, the anti-corrosion effect was poor, so
the corrosion inhibitor was not suitable for the corrosive
environment of the top part of the depentanizer. Later,
the company optimized the process anti-corrosion
measures to deal with the influencing factors covering
the corrosion inhibitor performance, dose and injection
point location. And the application results indicate that
the wet hydrogen sulfide corrosion was controlled effectively;
the pH value of condensate water increased to
7.0 ~ 9.0, the average iron content dropped to 3.3 mg/
L and there was slight corrosion in the equipment and
pipeline of the tower top corrosion system.
Key words: pyrolysis gasoline hydrogenation unit; process
anti-corrosion; corrosion inhibitor; wet hydrogen
sulfide corrosion
SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION
AND CONTROL OF DEFLAGRATION ACCIDENTS
IN CRUDE BENZENE TANKS[32]
Zhang Hui1, Jia Beibei2.(1.Yangmei Group Nagu
(Shanxi) Aerogel Technology Innovation City Management
Co., LTD., Yangquan, Shanxi, 045000;2. Safety
Production Management Department, Shanxi Yangmei
Chemical Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd., Taiyuan,
Shanxi, 030006)
Abstract: Fire work of the nitrogen protection pipeline
of crude benzene storage tank in a company triggered
a deflagration accident in the crude benzene tank. This
paper analyzes the safety risks from the aspects of tank
design, operation process of the crude benzene tank, fire
ABSTRACTS PETROCHEMICAL SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY
Bimonthly. 20 Oct. 2023 Vol. 39 No. 5 ·Ⅱ·
work of the nitrogen pipeline, change of operations and
safety management. The analysis identified the following
problems: the fire work was against related regulations;
regulations on construction safety (three inspections and
four regulations) were not strictly implemented; safety
risks and hazards were not rectified in time; there was a
lack of safety management in the inspection and control
process and the employees’ awareness of safety risks
was low. Aiming at these problems, the paper put forward
some suggestions on safety precaution and control.
Key words: crude benzene storage tank; process safety;
risks and hidden dangers; accident prevention and control
EXISTING PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS OF
OIL AND GAS RECOVERY DETECTION IN GAS
STATIONS[38]
Zhao Haiyang1, 2, Wang Yan3, Jia Liang4.(1. PetroChina
Henan Marketing Company, Zhengzhou, Henan,
450000; 2. Henan PetroChina Yubo Testing Technology
Co., Ltd., Zhengzhou, Henan, 450000; 3. PetroChina
Qinghai Marketing Company, Xining, Qinghai, 810017;
4. Henan Luoyang Oil Depot of PetroChina, Luoyang,
Henan, 471100)
Abstract: In the process of oil and gas recovery at gas
stations, there is a problem of high explosion limits.
Aiming at this problem, a new detection method for oil
and gas recovery at gas stations is proposed. By identifying
the risks of oil and gas recovery and revamp at gas
stations and relying on the principle of pressure balance,
a closed pipeline is used as an oil and gas collection
device. Based on the theory of gas transportation properties,
a calculation formula for the gas-liquid ratio in
the oil gun of the gas gathering station is derived, and a
combustible gas concentration detection model is constructed
according to this formula. The oil storage tank
of the refueling station is used as a closed container, and
an explosion-proof warning mode is set. The experimental
results are as follows: under different output pressure
conditions, the explosion limits of the designed gas station
oil and gas recovery detection method are 46.518%,
37.069%, 19.891%, and 12.235% respectively, which indicates
that the designed gas station oil and gas recovery
detection method has a wider application range.
Key words: gas station; oil and gas recovery testing;
revamp risk; explosion-proof warning
APPLICATION OF DUAL PREVENTION MECHANISM
IN THE TANK AREA OF NORMAL TOTAL
PRESSURE DEVICE IN ETHYLENE FACTORY[
42]
Zhong Jianlong, Zhou Hongbo, Li Xiang, Sun Yujun, Xu
Xingu.(PetroChina Dushanzi Petrochemical Company,
Dushanzi, Xinjiang, 833699)
Abstract: Dual prevention mechanism refers to the dual
control of risk classification prevention and control and
the management of hidden dangers. Through the application
of dual prevention mechanism in the tank area, the
risk control capacity in the tank area will be improved;
the level of risk classification prevention and control will
be implemented, and the control of hidden dangers will
be strengthened. The foundation of intrinsically safe production
and operation of tank farms will be strengthened.
Key words: dual prevention mechanism; risk prevention
and control in tank farm; investigation and management
of hidden dangers
ON THE DETERMINATION METHOD OF SULFUR
CONTENT BY X-SUPREME 8000 X-RAY
FLUORESCENCE SULFUR ANALYZER[46]
Hou Huiyu1, Li Guangyi1, Jiang Jianying2.(1. Petroleum
Chemical Engineering Department of Guangzhou Institute
of Technology, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510725; 2.
SINOPEC Guangzhou Company, Guangzhou, Guangdong,
510726)
Abstract: This paper mainly tests and discusses the
analysis method of X-Supreme 8000 X-ray fluorescence
sulfur analyzer for accurate determination of
sulfur content in crude oil, gasoline and diesel feedstock
oils, naphtha, diesel products, aviation kerosene
products and other oils. The analytical conditions have
been optimized, and different working curves have been
established according to different sulfur contents, and
the correlation coefficients were all greater than 0.999.
The experimental results indicate that X-Supreme 8000
X-ray fluorescence sulfur analyzer can accurately determine
the sulfur content of crude oil, gasoline and diesel
feedstock oils, naphtha, diesel products, and aviation
kerosene products. The repeatability and reproducibility
of the results can meet the requirements of the current
effective method GB/T 17040-2019.
Key words: X-ray fluorescence sulfur analyzer; X-Supreme
8000; sulfur content
NUMERICAL SIMULATION STUDY ON THE
DIFFUSION LAW OF CRUDE OIL LEAKAGE
FROM UNDERWATER CRUDE OIL PIPELINE[
50]
Wang Xiaoyu.(Safety and Environmental Protection Technology
Supervision Center, Panjin, Liaoning, 124011)
Abstract: It is difficult to detect and predict underwater
crude oil pipeline leakage, which poses a great
challenge to the handling of crude oil leakage. Based
on FLUENT software, this paper analyzes the diffusion
process of crude oil inside the water body during its upward
flotation when a leakage occurs in a (river bottom/
seabed) underwater crude oil transportation pipeline. And
it studies the diffusion shape and diffusion law of the
leaked crude oil when it reaches the water surface under
windless or windy conditions. The results show that: under
the research conditions of this paper, when the spilled
oil reaches the surface of the water body, the crude oil
is round on the surface of the water body, and gradually
spreads to the surrounding area with the passing of time,
and changes from a round shape to an oval shape, and ultimately
a larger range of diffusion occurs in the broken
and separated shape presented in different directions under
the windless condition; and under the windy condition,
the diffusion of the crude oil is mainly displayed as
a drift along with the direction of the wind, and the shape
of the crude oil remains largely unchanged.
ABSTRACTS PETROCHEMICAL SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY
Bimonthly. 20 Oct. 2023 Vol. 39 No. 5 ·Ⅲ·

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